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BOOK REVIEW ESSAY
ENEMY ALIENS:
DOUBLE STANDARDS AND CONSTITUTIONAL
FREEDOMS IN THE WAR ON TERRORISM
By David Cole. New York: The New Press, 2003, Pp. 256.

Elizabeth M. McCormick"

INTRODUCTION

In his State of the Union address January 20, 2004, President Bush declared
that the United States is a nation called to great responsibilities. "The greatest of
these responsibilities," he continued, "is the active defense of the American
people."' With this introduction, the President set the stage for the central theme of
his address to Congress and the nation - the preeminent role of the United States in
the war on terrorism. The President recognized the efforts of "hundreds of
thousands of American servicemen and women deployed across the world in the
war on terror," of law enforcement and intelligence agencies tracking terrorist
threats, and of the new Department of Homeland Security patrolling our coasts and
borders, and concluded that "their vigilance is protecting America." The President
cautioned, nonetheless, against false hopes that the danger is behind us. "We must
continue to give homeland security and law enforcement personnel every tool they
need to defend us. And one of those essential tools is the Patriot Act, which allows
Federal law enforcement to better share information, to track terrorists, to disrupt
their cells, and to seize their assets."2
The President's focus in his State of the Union address on the United States'
efforts to fight terrorism at home and abroad is not surprising. Since September 11,
2001, Americans have been understandably preoccupied with what their
government is doing to protect them from future terrorist attacks. While their fears
have on some level been assuaged by reports of the capture of certain Taliban and
Al Qaeda leaders, by the creation of a new Department of Homeland Security to
protect the nation against future terrorist threats, and by heightened security at
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President George W. Bush, State of the Union Address (Jan. 20, 2004), available at

http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases2004/01/printt2004Ol2O-7.htm
Union Address).
2. Id.

[hereinafter 2004 State of the
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airports and borders, many Americans have questioned whether the government's
responses to the terror threat have been effective or appropriate.3 Some have
criticized the United States for taking actions in the name of national security that
ignore the interests of the international community and violate international law.'
Still others have argued that the government's efforts to enhance security have
resulted in an unacceptable loss of privacy and liberty for many people living in the
United States.' Indeed, President Bush's assertion that "this great republic will lead
the cause of freedom," has been challenged by many who believe that the United
States' war on terrorism has instead undermined its legitimacy as a champion of
liberty, democracy, and human rights.
David Cole's ENEMY ALIENS, DOUBLE STANDARDS AND CONSTITUTIONAL
FREEDOMS IN THE WAR ON TERRORISM, sets forth a comprehensive and intelligent
assessment of the ways in which the war on terror has put the United States and its
citizens at risk.6 Cole argues persuasively that actions taken by the United States
since September 11 in the name of national security - rather than achieving a
"peace founded upon the dignity and rights of every man and woman,"7 - have
sacrificed the liberties of non-citizens and will ultimately jeopardize the liberty and
security of all citizens.
When a democratic society strikes the balance between liberty and
security in ways that impose the costs of security measures equally on all,
one might be relatively confident that the political process will achieve a
proper balance. Since September 11, we have repeatedly done precisely
the opposite, sacrificing the rights of a minority group - noncitizens, and

3.

See MIGRATION POLICY INSTITUTE, AMERICA'S CHALLENGE: DOMESTIC SECURITY, CIVIL
(2003) [hereinafter AMERICA'S CHALLENGE];
Donald Kerwin, Counterterrorismand Immigrant Rights Two Years Later, 80 No. 39 INTERPRETER
RELEASES 1401 (Oct. 13, 2003); Cam Simpson, Flynn McRoberts and Liz Sly, Immigration Crackdown
Shatters Muslim's Lives, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 16, 2003, at 1.
4.
See LAWYERS' COMMITTEE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, ASSESSING THE NEW NORMAL: LIBERTY
AND SECURITY FOR THE POST-SEPTEMBER 11 UNITED STATES 73-88 (2003) [hereinafter LAWYERS'
COMMITTEE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, ASSESSING THE NEW NORMAL]. In response to such criticisms
related to the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, President Bush declared, "From the beginning America has
sought international support for our operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, and we have gained much
support. There is a difference, however, between leading a coalition of many nations, and submitting to
the objections of afew. America will never seek a permission slip to defend the security of our country."
2004 State of the Union Address, supra note I (emphasis added).
5.
See U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL, THE SEPTEMBER
LIBERTIES, AND NATIONAL UNITY AFTER SEPTEMBER 11

11 DETAINEES: A REVIEW OF THE TREATMENT OF ALIENS HELD ON IMMIGRATION CHARGES IN
CONNECTION WITH THE INVESTIGATION OF THE SEPTEMBER 11 ATTACKS (April 2003)(released June 2,

2003) [hereinafter INSPECTOR GENERAL'S REPORT]; LAWYERS' COMMITTEE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS,
ASSESSING THE NEW NORMA, supra note 4; Human Rights Watch, Presumption of Guilt: Human
Rights Abuses of Post-September)) Detainees (Aug. 2002).
6.
DAVID COLE, ENEMY ALIENS, DOUBLE STANDARDS AND CONSTITUTIONAL FREEDOMS IN
THE WAR ON TERRORISM (2003). David Cole is a professor at Georgetown University Law Center, a
volunteer staff attorney with the Center for Constitutional Rights, and legal affairs correspondent for
The Nation.
7.
2004 State of the Union Address, supranote 1.
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especially Arab and Muslim noncitizens - in the name of the majority's
security interests."'
Although Cole recognizes that mediating the tension between liberty and security
on the backs of non-citizens is politically tempting because citizens do not lose
their rights and non-citizens do not vote, he presents a compelling four-part
argument for resisting this temptation and, instead, asking citizens and non-citizens
to bear any costs of enhanced security equally.
First, the distinction drawn between citizen and non-citizen is illusory in the
long run and ultimately, Cole argues, all citizens' rights are in the balance when the
government selectively sacrifices foreign-nationals' liberties in the name of
national security. Second, a history of overreaction in times of crisis suggests that
selectively burdening the aliens among us with a loss of fundamental rights is a
move that we will undoubtedly regret in the long run. According to Cole, we can
instead avoid that cycle of overreaction and apology by determining from the
beginning to strike the balance between security and liberty equitably for all.
Third, the double standard is counter-productive as a security measure because it
undermines the legitimacy, both in the United States and in the international
community, of the government's efforts to combat terrorism. Cole's fourth and
most compelling argument for refusing to engage in the double standard for
citizens and non-citizens is that it is morally and constitutionally wrong. The rights
and freedoms of non-citizens which have been restricted, Cole argues, are human
rights, not privileges of citizenship. Our ability as a nation to recognize and protect
these rights for citizens and non-citizens alike will, he promises, ultimately be the
test of "the character of America's future."
THEIR LIBERTY, OUR SECURITY
The disproportionate burden borne by non-citizens since September 11 in
exchange for enhanced security is beyond cavil.' Non-citizens have been subjected
to interviews, registration, automatic detention, and removal. They have been tried
in secret and subjected to lengthy and coercive interrogation without benefit of
8.
COLE, supra note 6, at 5.
9.
An assessment of whether or not these measures actually serve to enhance security is central
to Cole's argument against the double standard. See also AMERICA'S CHALLENGE, supra note 3, at 7
("The U.S. government's harsh measures against immigrants since September 11 have failed to make us
safer, have violated our fundamental civil liberties, and have undermined national security.") See also
Simpson, McRoberts and Sly, supra note 3 (assessing the impact of post-9/l 1 immigration policies
aimed at men from Muslim countries); Stevenson Jacobs, Terror Suspects Reach 2-Year Mark At
Guantanamo - PrisonersStill Waiting ForCharges, Trials, S. FLA. SUN-SENTINEL, Jan. 11, 2004, at A7
(describing the indefinite detention of hundreds of foreign nationals designated as enemy combatants including three boys aged 13 to 15 - at Camp X-Ray in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba); Carol Morello, This is
the First Time I Saw the American Sky, WASH. POST, Feb. 3, 2004, at B 1 (describing the prolonged
detention of a Tibetan nun seeking asylum in the U.S. as part of a post-9/l1 Department of Homeland
Security policy permitting the automatic, arbitrary and open-ended detention of asylum-seekers);
INSPECTOR GENERAL'S REPORT, supra note 5 (detailing verbal and physical abuse of immigration
detainees, overly restricted access to counsel, and prolonged detention without charge or access to bail).
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counsel. They have been excluded or removed from the United States based on
speech or wholly innocent political associations. They have been subjected to
indefinite detention on the whim of the Attorney General. These "security
measures" were the subject of little protest, Cole argues, because they were aimed
at non-citizens. Where the government, on the other hand, has taken steps to
enhance security that would have had a broad impact on the liberties of United
States citizens, the response has been entirely different. Indeed, though many
Americans expressed a willingness after September 11 to sacrifice civil liberties for
more security, the sacrifices demanded so far have been primarily from noncitizens, and Cole offers example after shameful example of how the war on terror
has been waged largely through measures targeting foreign nationals.
The Immigration Law Nostrum
Beginning with the earliest days of the war on terror, Cole describes the Justice
Department's efforts to use immigration law as a pretext to apprehend and detain
people who might commit terrorist acts in the future. Attorney General John
Ashcroft's strategy of preventive detention, aimed almost entirely at non-citizens,
emerges as one of the primary weapons in the war on terror. It is a strategy Cole
recognizes as a failure on a couple of levels.
First, the preventive detention program has proven to be an absurdly blunt
instrument with which to identify and apprehend terrorists. Though the actual
numbers are impossible to ascertain because the government has been generally
unwilling to disclose even the most basic information about the detainees," Cole
estimates that more than five thousand people had been detained by May 2003.12

10.
Operation TIPS (Terrorism Information and Prevention System), which involved a plan to
recruit millions of private individuals to snoop on their fellow citizens and share what they found with
the Department of Justice, was ultimately deleted from the final version of the Homeland Security Act.
Republican Majority Leader Dick Armey, who led the fight against TIPS, declared that he would not
allow a law enabling "Americans to spy on one another." Nat Hentoff, The Death of Operation TIPS,
VILLAGE VoicE, Dec. 13, 2002, at http:lwww.villagevoice.comlissueslO2511hentoff.php. Vocal public
criticism led to a similar fate for a proposal for national identity cards for citizens and the application of
the Pentagon's "Total Information Awareness" program to citizens. Cole, supra note 6, at 6.
11.
In response to these secret arrests, numerous public interest groups filed a lawsuit under the
Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552, and the First Amendment, to force disclosure of the
number, names, locations, and lawyers of people arrested in the post-September 11 terror investigations.
See Ctr. for Nat'l Sec. Studies v. U.S. Dept. of Justice, 215 F. Supp. 2d. 94 (D. D.C. 2002). The
government argued that disclosure of the information would threaten national security because it would
inform terrorist organizations which of their members had been apprehended. The United States District
Court for the District of Columbia ruled that the detainees' identities had to be disclosed, rejecting the
government's argument that a release of diverse pieces of information about the detainees would permit
the terrorists to piece the government's anti-terrorism strategy together as in a "mosaic." Id. The Court
of Appeals reversed, holding that the "judiciary is in an extremely poor position to second-guess the
executive's judgment in this area of national security." Ctr. for Nat'l Sec. Studies v. U.S. Dept. of
Justice, 331 F.3d 918, 928 (D.C. Cir. 2003), cert.denied 124 S. Ct. 1041 (2004).
12.
This number includes people arrested in connection with a Special Registration Program
directed at Arab and Muslim non-citizens and the Absconder Apprehension Initiative, which gave
priority to tracking down and removing the 6000 Arabs and Muslims among the more than 300,000
aliens in the United States with outstanding removal orders.
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Of these, not a single one has been charged with involvement in the events of
September 11.3 Only five have been charged with terrorist-related crimes, three
non-citizens and two citizens. "[B]y the government's own account, nearly all of
the thousands it has detained in the war on terrorism have turned out to have
nothing to do with terrorism.' 4 The government's resources, Cole implies, would
have been more productively spent on non-immigration related anti-terror
initiatives.' 5
Cole next criticizes the Justice Department's use of the immigration law as a
pretext to target non-citizens, without any basis for suspecting them of terrorist
activity. He points out that, despite the department's focus on foreign terrorists, the
majority of those charged with terrorism crimes since September 11, like the
perpetrator of the most deadly terrorist attack on United States soil before
September 11, Timothy McVeigh, were United States citizens. In other words,
since it cannot be said that the terrorist threat comes entirely from abroad, the
decision to wage the war on terror against non-citizens in particular was misguided
and cynical. Cole goes on to describe the pretextual use of the immigration law as
follows:
the immigration law functions largely as does the traffic law for drug law
enforcement: it affords a convenient pretext for targeting millions of
individuals. And just as the traffic laws facilitate "driving while black"
enforcement, so the immigration law has permitted ethnic profiling. In the
wake of September 11, Ashcroft targeted the Arab and Muslim immigrant
community, and stretched, twisted, exploited, altered and in many
instances, violated immigration law to achieve his preventive detention
goal.

16

This selective enforcement of the immigration laws has permitted the
government to take aliens into custody and detain them while they investigate
suspected terrorist activities. The alien might be brought in on a minor violation
that would otherwise be ignored by immigration officials, or he might be brought in
and detained, at least initially, without even an allegation of any immigration

13.
Zacarias Moussaoui, the supposed twentieth hijacker, was arrested before September 11.
Sarah Downey, Who is ZacariasMoussaoui?, NEWSWEEK,Dec. 14, 2001, at http://msnbc.msn.com/id/
3067363.
Cole, supra note 6, at 26. Cole has even suggested that, given the abysmal success rate of
14.
the preventive detention program, it is in fact only because his targets are foreign nationals and not
citizens that John Ashcroft still has a job. David Cole, Terrorism's Heritage? Legislative and Executive
Responses to Terrorism and Their Constitutional Ramifications, Remarks at Co-Sponsored Program of
Sections on Constitutional Law and Immigration Law, Association of American Law Schools Annual
Meeting (Jan. 3, 2004).
15.

See AMERICA'S CHALLENGE,

supra note 3, at 7 ("Our research indicates that the

government's major successes in apprehending terrorists have not come from post-September 11
immigration initiatives but from other efforts such as international intelligence activities, law
enforcement cooperation, and information provided by arrests made abroad.")
16.
Cole, supra note 6, at 24-25.
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infraction. When existing immigration law has not offered the government enough
flexibility to accomplish its enforcement and intelligence mission, the law has been
changed. For example, a post-September 11 amendment to the immigration
regulations allows detention without charge for up to forty-eight hours and for "an
additional reasonable period of time" in cases of emergency or other extraordinary
circumstance. 7 Prior to that amendment, the regulations required a determination
on charges and on custody or release within twenty-four hours of the warrantless
arrest of an alien.'" Another new regulation allows counsel for the Department of
Homeland Security, in certain cases, to keep an alien in custody after an
immigration judge orders release by simply asserting that DHS will file an appeal. 9
The release order is automatically stayed, regardless of the likelihood that DHS
will succeed on appeal. Regulations like these, Cole suggests, exemplify the
usefulness of the immigration laws as a pretext. That is, the use of immigration
law and procedures for preventive detention allows the government to avoid
constitutional requirements of criminal law procedures -- access to courts,
representation by counsel, probable cause hearings, public access, and access to
bail. 20
Even commentators who might disagree with Cole's criticisms of the use of
immigration law as a pretext have recognized the potential for abuse that overreliance on immigration detention as a response to terrorism presents. David
Martin, Professor of Law at the University of Virginia and former INS General
Counsel, rejects the view that arresting aliens who have overstayed visas or entered
the United States without inspection is merely a technical or pretextual use of the
immigration laws.2 ' "Those whose immigration violations are unearthed because of
enforcement actions started for other purposes, such as steps against terrorism,
have no legitimate complaint if they are then placed into removal proceedings,"

17.
See 8 C.F.R. § 287.3(d).
18.
See 8 C.F.R. § 287.3(d), 62 Fed. Reg. 10390, Mar. 6, 1997. ("Custody procedures. Unless
voluntary departure has been granted pursuant to subpart C of 8 CFR part 240, a determination will be
made within 24 hours of the arrest whether the alien will be continued in custody or released on bond or
recognizance and whether a notice to appear and warrant of arrest as prescribed in 8 CFR parts 236 and
239 will be issued.")
19.
8 C.F.R. § 1003.19(h)(4)(i)(2)("Automatic stay in certain cases. In any case in which the
district director has determined that an alien should not be released or has set a bond of $10,000 or
more, any order of the immigration judge authorizing release (on bond or otherwise) shall be stayed
upon the Service's filing of a Notice of Service Intent to Appeal Custody Redetermination... and shall
remain in abeyance pending decision of the appeal by the Board of Immigration Appeals. The stay shall
lapse if the Service fails to file a notice of appeal with the Board... within ten business days of the
issuance of the order of the immigration judge.")
20.
The Center for Constitutional Rights has filed a lawsuit on behalf of non-citizen detainees
held after September 11. The complaint alleges that plaintiffs were detained despite having received
and accepted deportation orders and were subjected to severe conditions during detention, including
beating, verbal abuse, solitary confinement and denial of right to religious practice. Turkmen v.
Ashcroft, CV-02-2307 (E.D.N.Y., second amended complaint filed June 18, 2003).
21. Statement of David Martin to the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United
States, Dec. 8, 2003, at http://www.9-Ilcommission.gov/hearings/hearing6/witness- martin.htm (last
visited Feb. 29, 2004) [hereinafter Martin Statement to National Commission on Terrorist Attacks].
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Martin argues.22 Nevertheless, noting the Supreme Court's affirmation in Zadvydas
v. Davis3 that "freedom from imprisonment . . . lies at the heart of the liberty that
[the Due Process] Clause protects," Martin has concluded that "the government's
use of detention after September 11 often fell short of this standard . . . Many
times the Department, although initially justified in its use of detention, did not
follow through with needed measures to file charges in a timely fashion, to keep
detention to a minimum, or to release or deport promptly those whose continued
detention should not have been seen as justifiable.""4 Referring to the amendment
extending the permissible pre-charge detention period, Martin calls for its repeal
and notes that "[e]scape hatches, especially ones bounded only by vague terms like
'reasonable period' simply invite sloppy implementation and departure from the
Similarly, he
limiting principles that should govern the use of detention."'
recommends revisiting the regulation authorizing automatic stays of release orders,
because of indications that it was "being used routinely and without careful
calculation by the enforcement agencies of the individual merits that led the
[immigration judge] to reduce bond in the first place." 6 Thus, while Martin
believes that it is perfectly legitimate to use the immigration laws to remove aliens
from the United States who might be involved in terrorism," he recognizes, like
Cole, that these same aliens are entitled to a full and fair process for determining
whether they should be detained or removed.
Unfortunately, a lack of access to information about the government's terror
investigations has, at a minimum, made it difficult to determine to what extent
aliens targeted by these investigations are being afforded due process. If secrecy
has been a key component in the government's war on terror in general,28 it has
been no less important, Cole contends, in the context of the preventive detention
program. Ten days after September 11, Chief Immigration Judge Michael Creppy,
at the direction of the Attorney General, issued a memo to all immigration judges

22. Id.
23. 533 U.S. 678 (2001)(holding, in a review of habeas petitions brought by aliens held in INS
custody well beyond the mandated 90 day post-removal order period, that indefinite post-removal
detention is not permitted).
24. Martin Statement to National Commission on Terrorist Attacks, supra note 21, at 5.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 7.
27. "When the immigration agency is seeking only deportation as the ultimate sanction, it is simply
good government to file only the simplest and most straightforward charge - typically an overstay or
EWI charge, which can be proven from government records or the absence thereof... Terrorism charges
pose, in contrast, significant challenges of case management and proof... There is simply no point in
adding those complications if there is another easily provable charge. The person's removal from the
country is the same whether the charge is overstay or terrorism." Id. at 4.
28.
See LAWYERS' COMMITTEE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, ASSESSING THE NEW NORMAL, supra note
4, at iii.
('*The two years since September 11 have seen a shift away from the core U.S. presumption of
access that is essential to democratic government - the presumption that government is largely open to
public scrutiny.. .Today the default in America has become just the opposite - the work of the executive
branch increasingly is conducted in secret.")
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with "special instructions for cases requiring additional security."2 9 Among other
things the memo ordered that all cases designated as of "special interest" to the
Department would be conducted in secret, with no visitors, family, or press
permitted to be present during hearings, and prohibited any release of information
about the case, including even the confirmation or denial that the case was on the
docket.3 This order was contrary to the usual practice in Immigration Court of
allowing public and press access in the absence of an individualized determination
by an immigration judge to close a hearing to protect the interests of a witness,
party or the public. Although the government asserted that the order was based on
both the privacy interests of the detainees and national security interests, Cole
rejects this explanation for a couple of reasons." First, in most of the "special
interest" cases, there was no classified information involved.32 Second, the order
did not prohibit detainees or their lawyers from releasing information about a
special interest case or hearing and, as a rule, the government took no steps to
otherwise prevent disclosure of case related information. Despite the alleged
concerns about national security, Cole argues, "the government itself did not take
the steps one would fully expect it to take were disclosure of the information
presented at the hearings truly a threat to national security.

33

Cole suggests that

the real motivation for the secrecy was public relations. Simply put, the
government wanted to keep the public from discovering that thousands of people
had been locked up for no good reason and that the government's broadly cast net
had yielded no suspects.' Such a revelation would, at a minimum, reflect badly on
the government's efforts in the war on terror and undermine the public's
confidence in the government's ability to protect them.33

29.
Memorandum from Chief Immigration Judge Michael Creppy to All Immigration Judges Re:
Cases Requiring Special Procedures (Sept. 21, 2001)(relaying details of order from Attorney General
Ashcroft)(on file with author).
30.
Id.
31.
Cole is not alone in his criticism of secret hearings. Lawsuits were filed in federal courts in
New Jersey and Michigan seeking an order requiring that the hearings be open, with mixed results. See
Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft, 195 F. Supp. 2d. 937 (E.D. Mich. 2002), aff4 303 F.3d 681 (6th Cir.
2002)(affirming district court's grant of an injunction prohibiting the closing of the hearings). But see
North Jersey Media Group, Inc. v. Ashcroft, 308 F.3d 198 (3d Cir. 2002)(reversing district court
decision enjoining the Attorney General from denying public access to immigration hearings).
32.
Cole reports that none of the 611 special interest proceedings before May 2002 involved
classified information. Cole, supranote 6, at 27.
33.
Id.
34.
Cole suggests that the secrecy has not, in any event, been effective as a public relations tool,
and others have suggested that the Department's decision to close immigration hearings "only increased
suspicion that Arab- and Muslim-Americans were being treated under a different standard of due
process." See AMERICA'S CHALLENGE, supra note 3, at 9-10.
35.
Cole, supra note 6, at 30. In the end, secret hearings were not enough to protect the public
image of the government's preventive detention program. In June 2003, the Inspector General of the
Justice Department issued a report highly critical of the Justice Department's post-September 11
detention policies and practices. See INSPECTOR GENERAL'S REPORT, supra note 5. The report
documents numerous abuses related, inter alia, to the classification of detainees as "of interest," the
procedures for notice of charges, the clearance process, bond and removal issues, and conditions of
detention. The report alleges, among other things, that many detainees were subjected to physical and
verbal abuse, unjustifiably denied bail, detained for unduly long periods, and refused access to counsel.
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Targeting Enemy Combatants
The government has been similarly interested in maintaining a veil of secrecy
with regard to the detention and treatment of hundreds of foreign nationals held at a
United States military base in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. These detainees, all
captured as part of the war on terror, and purportedly taken into custody for their
connections with Al Qaeda or the Taliban, have been held incommunicado, without
access to counsel, without charge, and without any kind of hearing - some for more
than two years. 6 The detention, according to the Bush administration, is pursuant
to the military's power to capture and detain, during wartime, enemy combatants,37
and the President has ordered that anyone arrested as an enemy combatant in the
war on terror be tried by military tribunal. 8 Cole points out that, although the
Constitution permits trial by military tribunal for citizens accused of fighting with
the enemy, at least initially the administration limited the application of military
justice to non-citizens. Cole suggests that this was a decision based on politics, not
law, which in the end proved well-calculated. Though there was widespread
condemnation from human rights organizations and the international community in
connection with the treatment of non-citizen "enemy combatants,"39 it was not until
military custody was imposed on two United States citizens that there was a
comparably critical reaction from the American public. According to Cole, the
ultimate extension of the enemy combatant designation to citizens Yasser Hamdi
and Jose Padilla,' and the dramatically different public response to their arrests and
detention, is indicative not only of the willingness of the American public to allow
non-citizens to disproportionately sacrifice their freedom for the security of the

36.
Neil A. Lewis, U.S. Will Free 5 Britons Held At Cuba Base, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 20, 2004, at
A20.
37.
Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, Arts. 3-5,
6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135. "Combatants and civilians are treated differently under humanitarian
law. Combatants - defined principally as 'members of the armed forces of a Party to a conflict' - may
be held as prisoners of war until the end of the hostilities as a means of preventing them from returning
to participate in the conflict." LAWYERS' COMMITTEE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, ASSESSING THE NEW
NORMAL, supra note 4, at 51, citing Brief of Amici Curiae Experts on the Law of War (Judge Patricia
Wald, et al.) in support of Petitioner-Appellee/Cross-Appellant Jose Padilla and Partial Affirmance and
Partial Reversal, at 14; Padilla v. Rumsfeld, availableat http://www.lchr.org/us law/padilla war exp.pdf
(last visited Aug. 31, 2003).
38.
Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the War Against Terrorism, 66
Fed. Reg. 57833 (Nov. 13, 2001).
39.
See U.S. Criticized on Guantanamo Prisoners, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 10, 2004, at
http://www.kuwaitidetainees.org/medialAPO11004.htm (last visited Feb. 20, 2004); Richard Cohen,
Lawless in Guantanamo, WASH. POST, Jan. 20, 2004, at A19; Guantanamo Inmates Get New Rights,
BBC NEWS, Feb. 13, 2004, at http://news.bbc.co.uk.go/pr/fr/-21hiameicas/3487543.stm (last visited
Feb. 21, 2004).
40.
Yasser Hamdi was allegedly captured on a battlefield in Afghanistan fighting for the Taliban.
Jose Padilla was arrested in Chicago O'Hare Airport for allegedly planning to detonate a radioactive
"dirty bomb" and meeting with members of Al Qaeda. Though not held at Guantanamo, both Hamdi
and Padilla have been held incommunicado, without trial or charges, and denied access to counsel.
Legal challenges to their detention are pending. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 337 F.3d 335 (4th Cir. 2003),
cert. granted 124 S.Ct. 981 (U.S. Jan. 9, 2004) (No. 03-6696); Padilla v. Rumsfeld, 352 F.3d 695 (2d
Cir. 2003), cert. granted 72 U.S.L.W. 3488 (U.S. Feb. 20, 2004) (No. 03-1027).
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majority, but also of the ease with which the government's distinction between
citizen and non-citizen can be blurred in times of crisis. The political momentum
which initially permitted the infringement of the rights of foreign nationals can all
too quickly spin out of control, Cole argues, and take with it the freedoms of
citizens and non-citizens alike.
As applied to both citizens and non-citizens, Cole argues that the government
has far exceeded its authority under the Geneva Convention to detain enemy
combatants. The detainees, first of all, have not been afforded the minimal legal
rights established for prisoners of war under the Convention, including the right to
a hearing on the issue of whether or not they are enemy combatants." Given the
nature of the untraditional war at issue, and the fact that, like Jose Padilla, many of
those detained at Guantanamo were not captured on the battlefields of
Afghanistan,42 Cole suggests that it is not at all clear that all of the detainees are
proper prisoners of war. Indeed, there is compelling evidence that many noncombatants may have been captured in the far-reaching hunt by the U.S. and its
allies for supporters of Al Qaeda and the Taliban 3 Cole points out that in the Gulf
War, the military held nearly 1200 hearings to determine the status of prisoners and
two thirds of those captured were ultimately determined to be non-combatants.
Although none of the Guantanamo detainees have been provided with a hearing to
determine whether they are legitimately held, more than ninety have been released
so far, the result of a "long and arduous intelligence process of deciding who
remains a danger and who can be released."'
In view of the releases to date, as
well as the government's recent statement that some detainees could be held for
many years," Cole's argument that the detainees are entitled to a hearing before a
competent tribunal to determine their status is all the more compelling.
Cole rejects the government's blanket assertion that all of those detained in the
war on terror are "unprivileged combatants" not entitled to the protected status of
prisoners of war. He asserts that President Bush's November 2001 order, calling
for the indefinite detention and trial by military tribunal of all persons apprehended

41.
Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, supra note 37, at art. 5.
Padilla and Hamdi have been able to obtain extremely limited judicial review of their detentions. In
Hamdi's case, the Court of Appeals concluded that because it was undisputed that Hamdi had been
captured in "a zone of active combat in a foreign theater of conflict," the court could not question the
government's factual assertions that he is an enemy combatant. Hamdi, 337 F.3d at 345. In Padilla's
case, a three judge panel of the Second Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that the President had no
authority under the Constitution to imprison an American citizen as an enemy combatant without any
charge and without judicial review when he was arrested on U.S. soil, unarmed, and far from any field
of combat. Padilla,352 F.3d 695. The Supreme Court will hear the appeals in both cases this spring.
42.
Among the approximately 650 detainees, there are nationals of forty countries arrested in
Afghanistan, Bosnia, Gambia and, possibly, Mauritania. LAWYERS' COMMrrrEE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS,
ASSESSING THE NEW NORMAL, supra note 4, at 53.
43.
Id. at 54 (noting that families of many of the detainees insist that their detained relatives were
humanitarian workers and that some of those released appeared upwards of seventy years old).
44.
Lewis, supra note 36.
45.
Id.
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in connection with the war on terror, ' is in contravention of Convention provisions
that prohibit the trial of prisoners of war for lawful acts committed during combat.
With regard to the Taliban, the United States has taken the position that because the
fighters did not wear uniforms distinguishing themselves from civilians and some
members engaged in war crimes, the Taliban as a whole is not entitled to prisonerof-war protections.4' A similar position has been taken with regard to members of
Al Quaeda. 4 Cole points out that, even if defensible, "the administration's position
fails to entertain the very real possibility that some of the detainees may not have
been involved in combat at all."49 Therefore, while the indefinite detention of these
so-called enemy combatants has been tolerated by the citizenry because it has for
the most part been "directed at someone other than themselves,"5 the detainees are
nonetheless entitled to some process for determining their status.'
Cole is not alone in his demands for a fair process for the Guantanamo
detainees. There has been a significant amount of public criticism, and a number of
legal challenges to the government's liberal use of the enemy combatant doctrine to
justify prolonged, incommunicado detention. The Lawyers' Committee for Human
Rights has called for the U.S. government to carry out its obligations under the
Geneva Convention to provide detainees with an individualized hearing in which
their status as civilians or prisoners of war may be determined, and to immediately
release those determined not to have directly participated in armed conflict.52
Similarly, David Martin has called on the administration to remember that the laws
of war, which permit the preventive detention of captured combatants until the end
of hostilities, bring with them certain fundamental protections, including
protections designed to distinguish combatants from civilians. "At the very least,
in the context of prolonged preventive detention, the principle [of distinction] calls
for an effective mechanism that gives detainees a timely opportunity to show that
they are in fact innocent civilians and to win prompt release in that case."'" Habeas
corpus petitions have been filed on behalf of a number of the detainees, seeking to
compel the government to reveal the legal basis for the detentions, and the Supreme

46.
Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the War Against Terrorism,
supranote 38.
47.
Press Secretary Ari Fleischer, Statement in the James S. Brady Briefing Room (Feb. 7,
2002), available at http://www.us-mission.ch/press2002/0802fleischerdetainees.htm (last visited Feb.
20, 2004) ("The Taliban have not effectively distinguished themselves from the civilian population of
Afghanistan. Moreover, they have not conducted their operations in accordance with the laws and
customs of war. Instead, they have knowingly adopted and provided support to the unlawful terrorist
objectives of the Al Qaeda.")
48.
Id. ("Al Qaeda is an international terrorist group and cannot be considered a state party to
the Geneva Convention. Its members, therefore, are not covered by the Geneva Convention, and are not
entitled to POW status under the Treaty.")
49.
Cole, supra note 6, at 42 (emphasis in original).
50.
Id. at 46
51.
Id. at 43.
52.
LAWYERS' COMMIITEE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, ASSESSING THE NEW NORMAL, supra note 4,
at 72.
53.
Martin Statement to National Commission on Terrorist Attacks, supra note 21, at 15.
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Court is expected to rule on the legality of the detentions before the summer.14 In
addition, a request for precautionary measures from the Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights has been issued, urging the United States to take
urgent measures necessary to have the legal status of the detainees at Guantanamo
Bay determined by a competent tribunal. 5
While the administration continues to assert that those detained at Guantanamo
are enemy combatants who pose a threat to the United States and its allies, and who
have no right to judicial review of their status, a significant number of the detainees
have been released or are scheduled to be released in the near future.56 Whether or
not the releases were in fact prompted by the heightened public criticism or by the
Supreme Court's decision to hear the detainees' appeals is a subject of some
speculation. 7 In any event it appears that, even though the administration still has
not acknowledged that any of the detainees are in fact entitled to any protections
under the Geneva Convention, the releases may be part of "a message to the court
that you can trust us in the government to deal fairly with these people."58 Cole
anticipates that message and argues against allowing the exercise of unchecked
executive detention authority. Indeed, Cole explains, it is precisely because the
government has proven untrustworthy in the past that we should resist the
temptation to allow an expanded use of that detention power again.
RELIVING HISTORY

If we are not vigilantly aware of our actions and attitudes toward non-citizens
in this war on terror, we are destined as a nation, Cole contends, to repeat the same
mistakes we have made countless times in the past. These are mistakes that we will
inevitably regret for a number of reasons, not the least of which is that "security

54.
The cases have been consolidated and the petitions for writ of certiorari have been granted
for the limited purpose of determining whether United States courts lack jurisdiction to consider
challenges to the legality of the detention of foreign nationals captured abroad in connection with
hostilities and incarcerated at the Guantanamo Bay Naval Base, Cuba. See Al Odah v. U.S., 321 F.3d
1134 (D.C. Cir. Mar. 11, 2003), cert. granted,72 U.S.L.W. 3327 (U.S. Nov. 10, 2003) (No. 03-343).
55.
The United States has rejected the IAI4CR's recommendation, asserting that the IAHCR
lacked jurisdiction to interpret the Geneva Convention and that, in any event, the precautionary
measures were not necessary or appropriate because the legal status of the detainees is already clear unlawful combatants not entitled to POW status. Response of the United States to Request for
Precautionary Measures - Detainees in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba (Apr. 15, 2002), available at
http://www.ccr-ny.org/v2/legal/september_ 1 th/docs/4-15-02GovemmentResponse.pdf.
56.
In early December 2003, a government spokesperson announced that as many as 140
detainees were scheduled to be released. Nancy Gibbs with Viveca Novak, Security breaches. Suicidal
detainees. A legal challenge heading to the Supreme Court. Welcome to Guantanamo,TIME MAG., Dec.
8, 2003, at 40. By mid-February, more than 80 had been released and six more were scheduled for
release. Lewis, supra note 36.
57.
Upon hearing of a statement by U.S. officials that some detainees were there because they
had been kidnapped by Afghan warlords and sold for the bounty the U.S. was offering for al-Qaeda and
Taliban fighters, David Martin replied, "If this report is true, we should be ashamed that it has taken this
long, nearly two years in most such cases, to recognized and rectify the error." Martin Statement to
National Commission on Terrorist Attacks, supra note 21, at 15.
58.
Lewis, supra note 36 (quoting Michael Ratner, Center for Constitutional Rights).
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measures targeted at immigrants have virtually always laid the groundwork for
future deprivation of citizens' rights." 9
Before beginning a lengthy discussion of the United States' appalling history
of selectively targeting the aliens among us for a loss of rights and liberties, Cole
explains that ambivalence toward non-citizens has run deep in the American
psyche for generations. While on the one hand a nation of immigrants, proud of
our heritage and diversity, at the same time there exists a general suspicion of
immigrants, "based on their racial, religious, and ethnic difference, and their radical
associations and ideas."' As a result, "we have incarcerated and deported foreign
nationals for their ideas, their beliefs, and the company they keep, while employing
summary procedures to do so."'" These measures were, according to Cole, initially
uncontroversial precisely because they were targeted at foreign nationals, a group
easily and frequently demonized in times of crisis. "Only when the government's
tactics affected a sufficiently large number of citizens did the country recognize the
errors of its ways."62
From the Palmer Raids to the Japanese internment to the Cold War, Cole
traces the history of America's overreaction to perceived security threats from
abroad with a pattern of overreaction and political repression aimed first at foreign
nationals and inevitably extended across the citizen-noncitizen divide. Indeed,
Cole suggests that, historically, anti-alien sentiment and tactics have been widely
exploited in the government's efforts to rationalize political repression. In other
words, because it has proven relatively easy in times of national crisis to harness
public antipathy toward the foreigner among us, the government has been able to
gain public support for what would be intolerable restrictions on liberty if applied
to citizens, only to later extend the restriction to citizens:
Virtually every significant government security initiative implicating civil
liberties - including penalizing speech, ethnic profiling, guilt by
association, the use of administrative measures to avoid the safeguards of
the criminal process, and preventive detention - has originated in a
measure targeted at non-citizens.
The government has frequently
defended such measures - legally and politically - by arguing that the
threat stems from abroad, and that non-citizens do not deserve the same
rights and protections as U.S. citizens . . . But almost as inevitably,
government officials have thereafter extended similar security measures to
63
U.S. citizens.
Cole's discussion of the Japanese internment of World War H, undoubtedly the
most extreme and shameful example of the historical pattern discussed above,

59.
60.
61.
62.
63.

Cole, supra note 6, at 90.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 87.
Id. at 85.
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reveals both how easily the citizen-noncitizen distinction is breached, and how the
extension of restrictive security measures to citizens is most readily accomplished
through the prism of race. Though carried out under the auspices of the Enemy
Alien Act, the order for internment of persons of Japanese descent was extended
from the beginning to Japanese-Americans, as well as Japanese nationals. One
hundred ten thousand people were detained, seventy thousand of whom were U.S.
citizens, and deemed to be presumptively loyal to Japan. Cole points out that no
German-Americans or Italian-Americans were detained during this time, and
suggests that the ease with which Japanese-Americans were encompassed into this
category of enemy aliens is explained by racism. "The close interrelationship
between anti-Asian racism and anti-immigrant sentiment made the transition from
enemy alien to enemy-race disturbingly smooth."' That the government's motives
were based on racist stereotypes is, according to Cole, substantiated by the fact that
none of the Japanese-American detainees was ever charged with or convicted of
any crime of espionage, treason, or sabotage. Nevertheless, he acknowledges that
the absence of evidence of criminal activity did not lessen the demands for their
internment. "[I]n arguments that foreshadow the 'sleeper' theories advanced about
Al Qaeda today, government officials argued that the very fact that Japanese aliens
and citizens living among us had not taken any subversive action only underscored
how dangerous they really were."6
Though in the end there is broad consensus that internment based on race or
national origin is wrong and that the Supreme Court decisions upholding the
government's anti-Japanese measures were wrongly decided, the Enemy Alien Act
has not been repealed. Because this act authorizes the prolonged detention, without
constitutional safeguards, of persons deemed dangerous based on a political
opinion presumed from national origin, Cole suggests that perhaps we have not
learned a lesson from history, that we remain capable - even if not necessarily
poised - to once again scapegoat the non-citizen in times of fear and crisis. He
reminds us of the true lesson that needs to be learned from the tragedy of the
Japanese internment: 'These propositions do not become wrong only when applied
to U.S. citizens, but are wrong as applied to any human being."'
The importance of this lesson is underscored by the fact that Fred Korematsu,
a U.S. citizen imprisoned in a Utah internment camp during World War II, has
authorized the submission to the Supreme Court of an amicus brief, in his name, on
behalf of non-citizens detained at Guantanamo." In 1942, Korematsu, then 22 and
64.
Id. at 97.
65.
Id.
66.
Id. at 100.
67.
The brief was filed in the cases of See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 337 F.3d 335 (4th Cir. 2003),
cert. granted 124 S.Ct. 981 (U.S. Jan. 9, 2004) (No. 03-6696), A] dah v. U.S., 321 F.3d 1134 (D.C.
Cir. Mar. 11, 2003), cert. granted,72 U.S.L.W. 3327 (U.S. Nov. 10, 2003) (No. 03-343), and Rasul v.
Bush, 215 F. Supp. 2d 55 (D. D.C. July 30, 2002), aff'd, Al Odah v. U.S., 321 F.3d 1134 (D.C. Cir.
Mar. 11, 2003) (consolidated appeal), cert. grante4 Rasul v. Bush, 72 U.S.L.W. 3327 (U.S. Nov. 10,
2003) (No. 03-334). Al Odah and Rasul are being held at the Guantanamo Bay facility in Cuba, and
Hamdi, a U.S. citizen, in a military brig in Virginia. Peter Schuler, Stone Writes Fred Korenatsu's
Amicus Brief As History Repeats, U. CHI. CHRON. (Nov. 6, 2003).
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working as a welder in an Oakland, California shipyard, refused to be put into an
internment camp. He was arrested, convicted, and ultimately sent to an internment
camp in Utah, where he and his family remained for the duration of the war. In
Korematsu v. United States,' the Supreme Court upheld his conviction, ruling that
because the United States was at war, the government could, on the grounds of
military necessity, constitutionally intern him without a hearing and without any
adjudicative determination that he had done anything wrong. Korematsu's brief
admonishes the court that "in order to avoid repeating the mistakes of the past, the
Supreme Court should make clear in these cases that the United States respects
fundamental constitutional and human rights - even in times of war. These cases
present the Supreme Court with a direct test of whether it will meet its deepest
constitutional responsibilities to uphold the law in a clear-eyed and courageous
manner."69 According to Professor Geoffrey Stone, who authored the brief on
Korematsu's behalf, "Fred Korematsu has committed himself to ensuring that
Americans do not forget the lessons of their own history."'
LEGITIMACY AND DOUBLE STANDARDS

Nous sommes tous Americains. We are all Americans. This was the headline
in Le Monde on September 13, 2001, a headline which expressed a sentiment
shared by many across the world. "How can we not feel," the article began, "as in
the most grave moments of our history, profoundly linked with this people and this
nation, the United States, with whom we are so close and to whom we owe
freedom, and therefore our solidarity." t The point of view reflected here was not
unique. In the aftermath of the terrorist attacks, the United States enjoyed the
overwhelming support and compassion of the international community. Moreover,
there was a sense that the only appropriate response was for the international
community to unite in its condemnation of these barbaric attacks and their
perpetrators. Almost immediately, however, it became clear that the United States'
response to the attacks would fail on many levels to garner the support of many of
its allies. Indeed, perhaps the most troubling aspect of the United States' response
was the perception that the United States was not particularly interested in reaching
out to form the kinds of coalitions that might succeed in preventing another
massive terrorist attack. Rather than seeking solidarity with its allies, Cole
suggests that the United States ultimately squandered much of the good will it
enjoyed after September 11 because it adopted a unilateral foreign policy and a
double standard imposing restrictions on the liberties of non-citizens that were not
imposed on citizens. The resultant lack of legitimacy in the international

68.
323 U.S. 214 (1944).
69.
Schuler, supra note 67.
70.
Id.
71.
Jean Marie Colombani, Nous Sommes Tous Americains, LE MONDE, Sept. 13, 2001
(translation by author).
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community, as well as in foreign national communities in the United States, has
undermined rather than enhanced national security.
As an initial matter, Cole points out that many of the tactics undertaken after
September 11 in the name of national security were, in addition to being
largely
ineffective
and
and
morally
objectionable,
constitutionally
counterproductive as security measures. The massive arrests, interrogations, and
detentions of foreign nationals from predominantly Arab and Muslim nations did
not succeed in uncovering any substantial leads in the war on terror. This is not
particularly surprising, Cole notes, since ethnic profiling has been largely
discredited as a law enforcement tool. Rather, the real danger of such methods is
that they waste valuable resources that would be better spent on law enforcement
measures that focus on what a person has done or plans to do, rather than who the
person is:
The proxies of Arab or Muslim identity or nationality are so inexact and
overbroad that virtually all of those questioned, registered or detained
have proven to be innocent of any terrorist activity. Locking up several
thousand people with no connection to terrorism is hardly a cost-effective
way to improve security."
Worse still, the wide net cast in an investigation based only on racial or national
identity, will certainly not yield those real terrorists who do not fit the ethnic
profile, and may not even detect those who fit the profile but whose involvement in
terrorist activities is less obvious than race or nationality.73
Cole suggests that the decision to target Arab and Muslim men for registration,
interviews, arrest and deportation effectively labeled an entire, overwhelmingly
law-abiding community as suspect and turned the members of that community
"from willing allies to wary adversaries."' This opinion has been widely shared.
Khaled El Fadl, Professor and Distinguished Fellow in Islamic Law at UCLA Law
School, has cautioned that "an important part of winning the war against terrorism
is actively resisting and guarding against the alienation of any part of our citizenry
. . . It is elementary that the more united our stand against terrorism, the more
effective we will be."7 Similarly, Vincent Cannistrano, former chief of operations
and analysis at the CIA's Counterterrorism Center suggests that targeting Muslim

72.
Cole, supra note 6, at 185.
73.
The danger of missing important pieces of evidence in such an indiscriminate investigation
has been emphasized by counterterrorism expert Juliette Kayyem of Harvard's John F. Kennedy School
of Government: "Ihe pure accumulation of massive amounts of data is not necessarily helpful,
especially for an agency like the INS that already has trouble keeping track of things . . . The idea that
[the special registration program] has anything to do with security, or is something the government can
do to stop terrorism, is absurd."
NORMAL, supra note 4, at 37.
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States (Dec. 8, 2003), at http://www.9-1lcommission.gov/hearings/hearing6/witness_elfadl.htm (last
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and Arab communities terrifies, angers, and drives into hiding the very people who
could most assist the investigations:
When we alienate the communities . . . we undermine the very basis of
our intelligence collection abilities because we need to have the trust and
cooperation of people in those communities. If someone comes from the
outside who is a stranger, comes into the community, the people who are
long established in that community know it or are in a position to know it,
and therefore to provide early warning information. But if the FBI
conducts sensitive interviews with community leaders at the same time
that that community has been rounded up by the INS, forced to report, and
everyone forced to report knows that if they are illegal, they are not a
document holder, that they can and will be deported, you've really kind of
eliminated the ability to get information that you really need."6
Therefore, according to Cole and others, if there are terrorists hiding in the Arab
and Muslim communities in the United States, it is more likely that they will be
discovered if the government takes steps to engender trust and cooperation, rather
than fear and outrage, among those living there. By failing to do this, and instead
sending a message that the fundamental rights of foreign nationals, especially Arab
and Muslim non-citizens, are expendable, the government has lost legitimacy in
these communities and squandered a valuable law enforcement opportunity.
This loss of legitimacy extends overseas, where the United States has been
widely criticized for measures selectively targeting non-citizens and for an
unwillingness to abide by rules that govern the rest of the world. Through its
failure to heed its obligations under international law, its willingness to bypass the
United Nations Security Council, and its prolonged detention of hundreds of
foreign nationals, the United States has compromised its moral authority and its
ability to maintain broad international support. These double standards, Cole
contends, hinder international cooperation essential to identifying and capturing
those plotting against us. "Intelligence and law enforcement support will turn at
least in part on the extent to which we are fighting for a broad principle of justice,
rather than for our own parochial self-interest."" Just as Benjamin Franklin
declared during the American Revolution that "[w]e fight not just for ourselves but
for all mankind," 78 Cole suggests that the United States must demonstrate that selfinterest is not its only motive for action. Robert Kagan expressed a similar
sentiment with his proposition that "[e]ven at times of dire emergency, and perhaps
especially at those times, the world's sole superpower needs to demonstrate that it
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wields its great power on behalf of its principles and all who share them. '79 To the
extent that the United States abandons the principles of justice and democracy in
the war on terror, it risks a loss of legitimacy and a consequent loss of ground to its
enemies. Like other critics of the war on terror, Cole recognizes that the
"'terrorists' greatest threat is to the survival of principle" and that our enemies
thrive when they succeed in forcing us to abandon our principles."0
Cole does not exaggerate when he asserts that the character of America's
future is at stake, and his criticism of American exceptionalism has been echoed
around the globe and at both ends of the political spectrum. The Department of
State has reportedly received complaints from many of the forty-two nations whose
citizens are being held in Camp X-Ray in Guantanamo,8 and the international press
has resoundingly condemned the post-September 11 treatment of non-citizens by
the United States government. 2 Judge Johan Steyn, a senior judge in Britain's
House of Lords, has called the United States' indefinite detention of alleged enemy
combatants at Guantanamo Bay a "monstrous failure of justice." 3 The Economist
magazine declared America's abuse of power over the Guantanamo prisoners
"unworthy of a nation which has cherished the rule of law from its very birth,"
accused the United States of "alienating many other governments at a time when
the effort to defeat terrorism requires more international co-operation in law
enforcement than ever before," and concluded that "America's casual brushing
aside of the Geneva Convention . . . made America's invocation of these same

conventions on behalf of its own soldiers during the recent Iraq conflict sound
hypocritical."" Indeed, according to Washington Post columnist Richard Cohen,
"the word Guantanamo has become shorthand throughout the world for American
arrogance and unilateralism." 5
Cole offers a number of concrete proposals for enhancing security without
sacrificing principle or undermining legitimacy.
Underlying each of his
suggestions is an admonition against any measure that unfairly burdens a minority
group with a loss of liberty in order to keep the majority safe. Measures which
79. Id. at B9 (emphasis added).
80. Cole, supra note 6, at 197; see also Khaled El Fadl, Statement to the National Commission
on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, supra note 75.
81. A Placein the Sun, Beyond the Law, ECONOMIST, May 10, 2003, at 12.
82. See Legal Double-Standards Are Not the Way to Win a War Against Terrorism,
INDEPENDENT, Jan. 14, 2002, at 3, quoted in Cole, supra note 6, at 195 (stating "An effective campaign
against terrorism requires the support, not just of Arab and Muslim countries, but of many other
countries in the developing world which are quick to sniff out Western hypocrisy. If the alleged
terrorists detained in Guantanamo Bay are denied democratic standards of justice or treated inhumanely,
the campaign will be seriously damaged.").
83. Jacobs, supra note 9. See also Johan Steyn, Guantdnamo: A Monstrous Failure of Justice,
INT'L HERALD TRiB., Nov. 28, 2003, at 6 ("Democracies must defend themselves . ..But in times of
war, armed conflict or perceived national danger, even liberal democracies adopt measures infringing
human rights in ways that are wholly disproportionate to the crisis. One tool at hand is detention
without charge or trial. Ill-conceived, rushed legislation is passed granting excessive powers to
executive governments which compromise the rights and liberties of individuals beyond the exigencies
of the situation. Often the loss of liberty is permanent."
84. A Place in the Sun, Beyond the Law, supra note 81.
85.
Richard Cohen, Lawless in Guantanamo,WASH. POST, Jan. 20, 2004, at A19.
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result in increased airport security, tighter immigration restrictions and border
control, or even potentially suspect limits on access to information about building
weapons of mass destruction, but which inconvenience or restrict all of us equally,
may strike an acceptable balance between liberty and security Cole suggests,
because the political process can be expected to correct any excess or abuse. On
the other hand, measures which distinguish between citizen and non-citizen, or
single out a particularly vulnerable minority, come at a substantial cost in terms of
our legitimacy among those who might be our partners in the war on terrorism. In
a rare moment of agreement with John Ashcroft, Cole quotes the Attorney General
back to himself: "To those who pit Americans against immigrants and citizens
against noncitizens . . . my message is this: Your tactics only aid terrorists... They

give ammunition to America's enemies, and pause to America's friends.""6
DOING THE RIGHT THING

In his final chapter, Cole's arguments turn from the practical to the humanistic
as he lays out his case for why the distinctions between citizen and non-citizen
relied on so heavily in the war on terror are just plain wrong. He sets forth a
compelling argument for why such distinctions are neither constitutionally justified
nor consistent with international law. The rights and liberties which have been
under assault in the war on terror - political and religious freedoms, due process,
equal protection of the laws - are not privileges of citizenship, but are "inherent in
what it means to be a free person with human dignity."87 Moreover, Cole reasons
that trading non-citizens' basis human rights in the name of security is wrong as a
normative matter. "When we balance liberty and security . . . we should respect

the equal dignity and basic human rights of all persons because it is the right thing
to do."8 Our nation's overwhelming failure to do so in the wake of September 11,
he warns, signals the loss of our own humanity.
Cole begins by challenging the widely held perception that non-citizens enjoy
many fewer rights than do citizens, pointing out that the Constitution
presumptively extends not just to citizens but to all who are subject to American
legal obligations and to all physically present in the United States.89 With the
exception of the right to vote and to hold public office, the Constitution makes no
distinction between the rights of citizens and non-citizens and, Cole points out, the
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the Guantanamo detainees are guaranteed certain fundamental rights under international law.
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courts have repeatedly recognized non-citizens' constitutional rights to due process,
equal protection and free speech. Beyond the Constitution, Cole argues that there
are certain basic rights to which all persons are entitled by virtue of their humanity
and points out that these rights - due process, equal protection, and political
freedoms - are recognized by international human rights instruments as applying to
nationals and non-nationals alike.' Finally, he looks to the practice in other states
as the basis for a normative argument for extending fundamental rights to noncitizens. Cole offers several examples - from Sweden to Canada to Great Britain
to Germany - of constitutional and statutory provisions granting equal rights and
freedoms to citizens and non-citizens alike. In light of this broad consensus, Cole
contends that "the rights of political freedom, due process, and equal protection are
among the minimal rights that the world has come to demand of any society."'"
Beyond their humanity, Cole argues that non-citizens, by virtue of their lack of
franchise and a history of anti-immigrant animus in the United States, are
particularly deserving of heightened protection of their fundamental rights. Unable
to participate in a political process that has on numerous occasions in the past
ignored and even obliterated the rights and interests of non-citizens, the case for
extending the Bill of Rights to non-citizens is all the more compelling. Moreover,
Cole argues the nature of the rights at issue - due process, equal protection,92 and
political freedom - provides no reasonable basis for distinguishing between citizens
and non-citizens. Free speech promotes values and interests - autonomy, critical
thinking, self-expression, and curbing government excess - in which citizens and
non-citizens have an equal stake. Similarly, Cole argues, the interests at stake
when the state seeks to deprive an individual of life, liberty, or property do not
usually depend on the citizen/non-citizen distinction. "While the definition of most
constitutional rights contains an implicit consequentialist balance, the balance
should be struck equally for all - even if it might appear convenient or politically
tempting to strike it differently for some."93
CONCLUSION

Although President Bush declared in his State of the Union address that
"because of American leadership and resolve, the world is changing for the

90.
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights explicitly guarantees these rights to "all
members of the human family." Cole, supra note 6, at 214, quoting RICHARD B. LILLICH, THE HUMAN
RIGHTS OF ALIENS IN CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL LAw (1984), at 41. In addition, the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights extends its protections to everyone "irrespective of
his or her nationality or statelessness." Id., citing General Comment 15, The Positionof Aliens Under
the Covenant, Human Rights Committee, U.N. Doc. HRI/GEN/I/Rev. I, at 18 (1994), 27th Sess., 1986,
at para. 7.
91.
Cole, supra note 6, at 215.
92.
Cole acknowledges that relevant differences between non-citizens and citizens do justify
some classifications based on alienage, but argues that beyond those limited differences noncitizens are
presumptively entitled to equal protection. Cole, supra note 6, at 227.
93.
Id. at 222.
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better,"' Cole raises serious doubts about the legitimacy of that leadership.
Contrary to the president's assertions, he suggests that in fact America's war on
terror has irreparably harmed the lives of many vulnerable and innocent people.
America has lost its credibility as the leader of the democratic world because,
despite the President's declaration that "God has planted in every human heart the
desire to live in freedom,"95 time and again since September 11 our government has
trampled on the freedoms of foreign nationals in exchange for the freedom and
security of American citizens. Rather than leading the cause of freedom, America
has sent the message that in times of crisis the rights and liberties of some can be
selectively dispensed with. This hypocrisy, Cole argues, has come at the cost of
our security, our liberty, and our integrity as a nation. "How we treat foreign
nationals, the paradigmatic other in this time of crisis," he concludes, "ultimately
tests our own humanity."" While on the one hand Cole optimistically challenges
America to learn from the lessons of history and to commit, in this war on terror, to
treating the fundamental rights of citizens and foreign nationals equally, ENEMY
ALIENS, DOUBLE STANDARDS AND CONSTITUTIONAL FREEDOMS IN THE WAR ON

offers a convincing albeit dismal assessment of how the United States
is likely to fare on a test of humanity.
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